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ON THE HISTORY OF FRENCH LEGAL ETHICS

JOHN LEUBSDORFF

How do a legal system's rules and expectations for the behavior of lawyers
develop? Ultimately, answering that question for any legal system requires exploration of many factors, including the history of the legal profession, the history
of the legal procedures and rules of law with which lawyers deal, the system's
broader social and political context, the development of lawyers' functions and
responsibilities, the evolution of society's thoughts about lawyers, and the moral
philosophy and ideals of the society. Answering this question also requires a
perspective and detachment that most of us find hard to bring to bear on our
own legal systems. Considering the development of legal ethics in another system may help us deal with the last difficulty, if not the others.
Seen from the perspective of an individual familiar with the United States
system, several factors shaping the growth of the ethics of French avocats stand
out. Avocats have traditionally worked within systems of civil and criminal procedure that have shaped their roles and ideals. They have worked with or against
members of other legal professions-magistrates, notaries, and others-to form
their own professional standards in a kind of ethical division of labor. The avocats' profession has been both actor and victim in French political struggles. Today as the profession faces competition from foreign lawyers and law firms as
well as from accounting firms, it has modified some of its traditional principles
and struggles to maintain others.
This paper will seek to trace how these and related factors have helped to
shape a basic feature of avocat legal ethics, the ideal of independence-from the
state, from clients, and from other avocats. Space permits only limited explication
of these ideals and of other matters here. For fuller discussion and more extensive supporting citations, I refer anyone interested to my recent book.'
t Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark.
1. John Leubsdorf, Man In His OnginalDigni.:LegalEthics in France (Ashgate 2001).
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I. INDEPENDENCE FROM THE STATE

Avocats as a group have traditionally seen themselves as an intermediary
body between the state and its citizens, helping the latter protect their liberties
from the former. This is a moral and political aspiration, but one that is embodied in concrete institutions and rules. Since the eighteenth century, France's local
bars (there are now 180 of them) have admitted and disciplined avocats. That is
not the function of the state, although nowadays legislation establishes most of
the standards for admission and discipline, and although courts can review bar
decisions. More strangely, from a United States perspective, avocats may not be
judges, prosecutors or government employees because that would imply a subordination to the state inconsistent with their independence.
The roots of the ideology of independence from the state date back to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when avocats lost their traditionally close
links with the bench. A determining factor was that judicial posts became purchasable and inheritable. 2 As a result, there arose on the one hand the judicial
"nobility of the robe" and on the other hand avocats who could (with rare exceptions) no longer hope for promotion to the bench or look up to colleagues who
had become judges as professional models. In the late seventeenth century, the
Paris bar proceeded to organize
itself as a self-governing "order," followed by
3
France.
in
elsewhere
bars
This scission from the bench has endured ever since, with a few exceptions
when a revolution led to the dismissal of politically incorrect judges and their
replacement by avocats. Today the magistracy is a separate profession, encompassing not only judges in the American sense but also prosecutors and investigating magistrates. Its members, in addition to receiving the ordinary legal education, attend a national magistrates' school in Bordeaux where they acquire an
esprit de corps that unites them through a lifetime of judging. Magistrates are
overworked and underpaid, and the public has tended to see them as subordinate to the state.4 This makes it easier for avocats (who contend with their own
kinds of public distrust) to portray themselves as independent. The two professions often regard each other with suspicion, and avocats have striven with some
success to limit judges' power to discipline avocats for courtroom misconduct.
In the eighteenth century, separation of the bar from the bench led to the
bar's assumption of a political role-paradoxically, often in alliance with the
judges. Legal briefs were free from the usual censorship, were used to express
more or less oppositional views, and were printed and circulated in substantial
2. See David A. Bell, Lawyers and Ciizens: The Making of a PoliticalElite in Old Rigime France45 (Oxford 1994).
3. See id at 50-58; Lucien Karpik, Les avocats entre l'taE,
le public et le marchi XIIIE-"X siicles chs 2-3
(Gallimard 1995).
4. Consider Daniel Soulez Larivi6re, Lesjnges dans la balance (Seuil 1990); Alain Bancaud, La haute
magistraturejudidaireentrepolitiqueel sacerdoce (LGDJ 1993).
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numbers. Because the Estates General, France's legislature, was not called into
session between 1614 and 1789, the courts known asparlementssought to assume
some of its functions. The resulting conflicts with the monarchy led several
times to strikes by both avocats and magistrates. These developments enabled the
bar to incorporate its independence from the state into its self-image and to sell
it to the public.5
To whatever extent the avocats andparkmentsmay have paved the way for the
Revolution-this is still in dispute-the Revolution showed little gratitude. It
abolished the parkments, setting up new courts that the executive and legislature
kept under their control. It also abolished the organized bar, with only Robespierre speaking in opposition.6 The reasons for this are largely unclear. However,
they probably included revolutionary opposition to monopolies and dosed corporations, the bar's division in the late eighteenth century, and the hope of avocats in the Constituent Assembly to leave their practices behind for government
posts.
For later avocats, this encounter with the Revolution only emphasized the
importance of independence. The Revolutionary regime's hostility to the bar
could easily be confounded with its later imposition of the Terror, the moral
being that the bar is an essential safeguard against governmental oppression.
Unregulated legal practitioners were, at least in the hindsight of avocats, sufficiently sleazy and incompetent to justify the revival of the old bar and all its
traditions.7

Napoleon's restoration of the organized bar in 1810 inculcated similar
teachings, not because it reinstituted the bar as it had been under the anden regime
but precisely because it did not.8 Suspicious of avocats' potential for subversion,
Napoleon kept them under tight control by vesting selection of bar leaders in
prosecutors, forbidding bar meetings, and imposing strict judicial supervision
and a loyalty oath. Once again, the message was that dictators fear an independent bar.
The bar's struggle to reclaim its independence lasted at least until 1870 and
further enshrined independence in the ideology of avocats. Still, the bar never
fully regained its pre-Revolutionary paradise. On the contrary, today's avocats are
subject to governmental regulation at least as stringent as that governing lawyers
in the United States. Modem avocats independence from the state is more an
ideal than a reality. The continuing menace of the French state teaches the importance of striving for the ideal more effectively than the comparatively wishywashy and lawyer-pervaded federal and state governments of the United States.
During the nineteenth century, the bar pursued independence not only in its
5.

See Bell, Lanersand CiW'Zens ch 2 (cited in note 2); Karpik, Les avocats chs 2-3 (cited in note 3).

6.

See Michael P. Fitzsimmons, The Parisian Order of Banisters and the French Revoluion (Harvard

7.
8.

Consider Bernard Sur, Histoiredes avocats en France: des otigines d nosjours129-48 (Dalloz 1998).
See id at 151-68, 169-73; Fitzsimmons, ParisianOrderof Barriters(cited in note 6).

1987).

344

Roundtable

[8:341

internal organization but also in its professional practice. Avocats represented
political dissidents assailed by the government in a variety of well publicized
trials. Sometimes the avocafs own politics differed from those of his client. Of
course, there were many conformist or pro-government lawyers, but much of
the bar united in the struggle for basic civil liberties. 9 That was good for the
polity but also for the bar, which reaped public approval. When the Third Republic arrived in 1870, it came to be known as the Republic of the avocats,
with
0
both the legislature and the ministries dominated by members of the bar.
This second period of political glory was no more lasting than the one preceding the Revolution. Some historians mark the Dreyfus case as the moment
when avocats yielded to writers like Emile Zola and Georges Clemenceau as protectors of public liberties." The avocats lost the strong position they had briefly
obtained in the government around the turn of the century and were replaced by
professional politicians and technocrats. 2 As the bar's economic position worsened, it became more likely to seek protection and assistance from the state than
to resist it.
Yet independence from the state remains an important ideal for French
lawyers. This ideal may find its best symbol in avocats' representation of defendants in criminal prosecutions, whether the defendant be on the left, on the
right, or (nowadays with increasing frequency) a former government official.
Because avocats serve as defense counsel but are never prosecutors or government lawyers, the bar constitutes a relatively united, albeit disorganized, lobby
for defendants' rights and more adversarial procedures. Occasionally it helps
secure liberalization of the traditionally harsh French system of criminal justice,
such as the legislation of 2000 that finally made it possible for defense counsel
to question witnesses. 13 Other developments, such as the European Court of
Human Rights, also have strengthened the notion of law as a protector of rights
against the state and hence the bar's role in that protection.

II. INDEPENDENCE FROM CLIENTS
Traditionally the avocat was not considered the agent of his 14 client. His acts
did not bind the client, and he was not subject to the client's directives. The
9. Jean-Louis Debr6, La Justice au XIXe siide: les ropubliques des avocats (Libraire Acadhmique Perrin
1984).
10. Yves-Henri Gaudemet, Lesjuristes et la vie polilique de la IlIe Rpublique (France 1970). Bar rules
allowed avocats to hold such positions without forfeiting bar membership by working for the state, ostensibly because legislators and ministers were not considered state employees.
11.
See Christophe Charles, Le dilin de la Ripublique des avocats, in Pierre Birnbaum, ed, La France de
l'affaire Dreyfus 56 (Gallimard 1994).
12. Consider Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobili:"Elite Schools in the Field of Power (Stanford 1996)
(Lauretta C. Clough, trans); Ezra N. Suleiman, Elites in French Societly: The Politics ofSurival (Princeton 1978).
13. Law No 2000-516, Arts 11, 25, 36, 39 (une 15, 2000).
14. Until 1900, women could not be avocats. Today more than 40 percent of the bar is female.
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practical and ironic effect of this principle was to give avocats greater control
over the client's case than they would have if deemed to speak for a client; for in
the latter case they would be subject to some extent to the client's control. Further, most bars prohibited avocats from suing their clients to recover a fee.
Each of these legal rules finds a parallel at some point in the history of English barristers.15 As in the case of baristers, some of what avocats could not do
was done for them by members of another legal profession. In France, these
professionals were known asprcureursbefore the Revolution and as avouft thereafter. While solicitors throve in England, however, the avouis declined in France;
avoui was abolished except in the appellate courts. Its
in 1971, the profession of
16
members became avocat.
In one respect, the independence of avocats from their clients has exceeded
that of barristers. Avocats were, and still are, required to keep communications
with other avocats confidential from their own clients. Of course, there are exceptions, such as settlement agreements, which cannot be concealed from the
parties who must sign them. The confidentiality rule might to some extent be
considered a roundabout equivalent of the United States rule excluding settlement discussions from evidence.17 Because an avocat may not repeat opposing
counsel's communications to a client, the latter will not be able to write them
down and submit them to the court. In this way, as in others, a French professional rule trespasses into what in the United States would be considered the
regulation of court procedure. But the French rule's implications and impact go
further, keeping clients outside of the core of a litigation process conducted
through collegial relationships between avocats.
The prohibition on suing for a fee likewise took on special significance in
France, where it became part of a broader requirement that avocats manifest disinterestedness.' 8 Following Roman precedent more than reality, an avocafs fee
was considered the gift of a grateful client During the nineteenth century, the
Paris bar even forbade its members to recover fees from an opposing losing
party for legal aid work. Because avocats in training had to do most legal aid
work, such restrictions tended to limit entry to the bar to those with independent means. Other rules had a similar exclusionary effect. For example, avocats
to
were forbidden to engage in trades or business and could secure admission
19
some bars only by demonstrating poisession of a properly furnished office.
15. See Rondel v Wotrsly, [1969] 1 AC 191 (HL 1967) (upholding immunity for barristers from acdons in negligence), overruled by ArthurJSHall & Co v Simons, [2000] 3 WLR 543 (HL 2000) (repudiating
barrister and solicitor immunity from actions in negligence); Paul Brand, The Ogins of the English Legal
Profession 98-99 (Blackwell 1992).
16. Law No 71-1130 (Dec 31, 1971).
17. Fed R Ev 408; Raymond Martin, Diontologiede l'avotat307-12 (Litec 5th ed 1999).
18. See Karpik, Les avocats ch 5 (cited in note 3).
19. Consider Andr6 Damien, Les avocats dm temps pas 35-40, 287-95, 372-94, 410-18 (Lefebvre
1973).
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These aspects of avocat independence originate from a pre-Revolution aristocratic ideal. The avocat was thought of as a gentleman who freely made his
eloquence and learning available to those in distress. He was a kind of judge,
accepting only those cases in which he believed and lending them his own
credibility-a concept diametrically opposed to the American view that a lawyer
does not vouch for a client's case. 21 An avocat could not sully his dignity by taking orders or seeking money. Until a few decades ago, an avocat could not even
go to a client's office.
The nostalgia that often dominated the nineteenth-century bar helped preserve the ideal of independence and its associated practices and rules. Avocats
strove to bridge the gap left by the Revolution by reprinting professional literature from the anden rgime, enforcing old practices, and lauding the profession's
antiquity and continuity. Even today discussions of professional ethics are pervaded by historical narratives encompassing not just the eighteenth century but
Chancellor D'Aguesseau's 1693 speech on lawyers' independence, the great lawyers' strike of 1602, the capitularies of Charlemagne, Gallic advocates of the
2
Roman era, and sometimes even Greek and Egyptian precedents.
The nineteenth-century bar devoted special efforts to exclude itself from the
rise of commerce and manufacturing. It went without saying (but was nevertheless said) that no avocat could be a corporate director or the salaried employee of
a business. To this day, many French corporate employees who perform work
that in the United States would be entrusted to lawyers are not members of the
bar but constitute a separate, entirely unregulated profession known as juristes
d'entreprise. The Paris bar sought to exclude even former business agents from
practicing and debated whether it was permissible for an avocat to sell vegetables
from his garden. Advertising was, of course, prohibited; an avocat could not even
list his office hours on his stationery. The bar was supposed to be dedicated to
the pursuit of justice and glory, not clients or money. Somewhat like many nineteenth-century French artists and authors, avocats claimed to stand apart from the
struggle for wealth, although the prints of Daumier show clearly enough that
not everyone in France accepted that claim.23
20. See Mark J. Osiel, Lazyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 Harv L Rev 2009,
2036, 2042-43 (1990).
21. See Maurice Garqon, L'avocat et le morale 41-48 (Buchet/Chastel 1963). Compare ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(b), 3.4(e) (1983). As Susan Carie's perceptive contribution to this Volume shows in its discussion of Moorfield Storey, an occasional elite lawyer in the United States (or at least
in Boston) has come close to the French conception. See Susan Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal
Ethics and the NAACP, 8 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 281, 285 (2001). Brandeis too might be accused of
behaving more like a judge than a lawyer. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeisas People's
Layer, 105 Yale L J 1445, 1500 (1996). See also id at 1473-86, 1498-1522; Richard Painter, Contracing
Around Conflicts in a Family Representation: Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 8 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 353
(2001).
22. Consider Jacques Hamelin and Andr6 Damien, Les Rigles de la profession d'avocat ix-xi, 1-25 (Dalloz 8th ed 1995).
23. See Damien, Les avocals du tempspassi 328-32 (cited in note 19); Honori Daurnier, Layers and
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The pursuit of independence caused the bar to deny itself almost all transactional and negotiating work and to confine itself to litigation. Many bars forbade
their members to handle client funds, to speak to an opposing party in the absence of their own clients, or to participate in transactions about which they
might later have to testify. Consequently, the despised business agents grabbed
some of this work.24 Much of it went to notaries, who have a statutory monopoly on documenting certain kinds of transactions. The notarial profession, still
thriving today, has its own historical roots and its own professional ethics that
derive from the notary's status as a sort of public official.5Notaries, for example,
are ordinarily free to act for both parties to a transaction.2
Renouncing transactional work, aside from protecting the bar's reputation
for disinterestedness and impairing its future prosperity, confined avocats to work
that was consistent with their traditional independence and behavior. It is possible, if not always desirable, for a lawyer to proceed through the mazes of litigation guided only by his or her own judgment as to what will advance the client's
best interests. However, it is hard to imagine a lawyer negotiating an important
contract without consulting the client for instructions. Clients conducting business transactions are likely to be wealthy, sophisticated repeat clients who expect
to be in charge of their own transactions.
The twentieth century did not leave untouched the bar's ideal of independence from clients. The decline of avouds and the desire of avocats to appear in
courts where avouis did not practice made it necessary for avocats to acquire the
power to bind their clients in procedural matters and hence to become agents
subject in principle to client control and liability to clients. Belatedly realizing
what it had foregone, the bar sought to enter business practice with its inevitable
push toward client control. Avocats won the right to sue clients for fees and to
enter fee contracts with them. They were even allowed to contract for partially
contingent fees, traditionally barred as tending to turn lawyers into economic
actors swayed by economic incentives rather than disinterested aristocrats
moved by conscience.26
Nevertheless, independence from clients remains important to avocats I have
interviewed. Avocats still may not be employees of their clients. The rule keeping
communications between avocats confidential continues to prevail, albeit with
recent clarifications and limitations, as does the rule that the client may not
waive the equivalent of the lawyer-client privilege. Rather, it is the avocat who
decides when to use client confidences in a case. An avocat still has the right to
Justice (Alpine Fine Arts Collection 1981).

24. See Jean Appleton, Traiti de la profession d'avocat 219-32, 323-40 (Dalloz 2d ed 1928); Daniel
Soulez Larivi6re, L'Avocature 83-85 (Seuil 2d ed 1995).
25. See Ezra N. Suleiman, PrivatePower and Centraliiadonin France:The Notaires and the State 236-47
(Princeton 1987); Gilles Rouzet, Prids de diontologie notaiale(Bordeaux 1991).
26. See Law No 71-1130, Art 10 (Dec 31,1971), amending Law No 91-647 July 10, 1991); Hamelin
and Damien, Les Re'gies de Iaprofessiond'avocatat 240-52, 343-66 (cited in note 22).
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decide whether to accept a client and the right to withdraw (while protecting the
client's interests) when continued participation would violate his or her conscience. 27

III. INDEPENDENCE FROM OTHERAVOCATS
Each French bar is, in theory, a republic of equals. Traditionally every avocat
was a sole practitioner. No form of partnership was allowed until 1954, and until
1990 an avocat could not be the employee of another avocat. Even apprentice
avocats (stagiaires)are entitled to have their own clients. "[T]he ethical principle of
equality among
avocat?' is written into the governmental decree regulating the
28
profession.
Rather than looking to colleagues within a firm, avocats regarded themselves
first as members of their local bar. The Paris bar, now numbering more than
13,000, might be too large to count as a family, but familial rhetoric was regularly used to describe both it and the many smaller bars, two thirds of which still
have fewer than one hundred members apiece. Avocats typically spent part of
each day at the courthouse, where between cases they socialized with colleagues.
They were expected to treat other avocats in a spirit of confraternity, to honor
promises to them, and to maintain the confidentiality of communications among
avocats as against clients (sometimes referred to as lesprofanes). The members of
each bar elected a Council and btonnier, or presiding officer. These officers
promulgated the bar's professional rules and enforced them through disciplinary
proceedings. Today, the bar provides its members with malpractice insurance, a
kind of bank for client funds, a national pension plan, and aid in times of need.
This system and its accompanying ideals originated before the Revolution.
That avocats were then sole practitioners is unsurprising because lawyers in other
nations were also sole practitioners at that time. As for the organization and
corporate ideology of the bar, these originated (as I have already mentioned) in
the late seventeenth century, growing out of an earlier religious confraternity.
What is hard to explain is the strength that the bar as an organization soon obtained. The English Inns of Court, which are much older than but somewhat
similar to the French bars, were never quite as strong or as central to professional ideals, and the organized bar in the United States is even less comparable.
The only causes for the strength of the French bar as an organization that I can
propose, and these are only suggestions, are the general corporate tendencies of
anden rggire France and the esprit de corps that its eighteenth-century struggles
infused in the bar.
After the Revolution, avocats again had to struggle to reestablish both an or-

27.

See Hamelin and Damien, Les Rigles de lapmfession d'avocat at 278, 298-306, 338, 382-85, 386

(cited in note 22).
28. Decree No 91-1197, Art 137 (Nov 27, 1991).
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ganized profession and the regulation of that profession through local bars. The
bar form of organization became further linked in avocats' minds -with the existence of the profession itself so that pre-Revolutionary traditions maintained or
increased their luster. In addition, the bar's renunciation of transactional work
contributed in two ways to protect the ideal of sole practitioners owing their
primary allegiance to their colleagues and the order uniting them. First, the absence of transactional work made it less attractive for avocats to unite in law
firms, which tend to arise when lawyers engage in corporate practice for large
businesses. Second, French civil and criminal procedure fostered traditional
patterns of practice.
To an outsider from the United States, one of the most striking features of
French litigation has been the way in which the avocafs role has been limited
almost entirely to the presentation of an oral argument. Civil cases in France are
decided on the basis of a written record. When a case is heard each avocat presents contracts, letters, witness statements, and other documents to a panel of
judges in an extended statement of the facts interspersed with legal argument.
This is the heart of the auocafs role. There is virtually no pretrial discovery (although the. inquiries of a court-appointed expert sometimes provide a substitute). Ethical concerns tend to prevent avocats from approaching potential witnesses other than their clients. (When avouis still existed, they did much of the
preliminary procedural work.)29
Although French criminal procedure is very different from French civil procedure, the criminal avocats role winds up being remarkably similar to what it
would be in a civil case. Under the inquisitorial system, the decisive part of a
prosecution is the investigation by the police, prosecutor or investigating magistrate. The trial serves mainly to ratify the results of that investigation. When
cases are brought to trial, acquittals are rare. Although questioned at trial by a
judge, the defendant and witnesses are in practice more or less bound by what
they said during pretrial interrogations. Most cases are tried by judges. In the
few instances in which the gravity of the alleged crime requires a jury, the judges
deliberate and vote together with the jurors. The main function of the avocatis to
present a dosing argument, which often seeks mercy in sentencing rather than
acquittal of the defendant 3
These characteristics of civil and criminal procedure have helped maintain a
litigating bar whose activities focus on courtroom rhetoric and the analysis of a
written file rather than on investigation, procedural maneuvering, or the exami29. For an introduction to French civil procedure, see Jean Vincent and Serge Guinchard, Protdure
diile (Dalloz 25th ed 1999); James Beardsley, Proofof Fact in French Civil Procedure,34 Am J Comp L 459
(1986).
30. Bron MeKillop, Anatomy ofa French MurderCase, 45 Am J Comp L 527 (1997); Bron McKillop,
Readings and Hearings in French CriminalJustice: Five Cases in the Tribunal Correcionel, 46 Am J Comp L 757
(1998). Recent legislation allows avocats to question witnesses. Law No 2000-516, Arts 11, 25, 26, 34 (June
15, 2000).
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nation of witnesses. Rhetoric is an art for individuals, indeed for individualists,
not for firms. One avocat could usually handle a case without assistance, resorting when necessary to a collaborator who was, at least in theory, an independent
member of the bar. The avoca/'s main contacts may have been with opposing
counsel rather than with clients or co-counsel. Certainly, professional authors
from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries praised time and again
the fidelity with which avocats exchanged documentary evidence with each other
before the hearing of civil cases-not the avocats' devotion to the interests of
their clients. Today this exchange among avocats continues to be a focus of ethical concern in the form of frequent attempts to discipline avocats for alleged delinquencies. The procedural system also ensured that avocats spent much of their
time in the courthouse where so many of their activities occurred, favoring sociality among avocats and engagement in bar activities.
This pattern is now changing as the bar seeks to move into transactional
practice. The shift requires law firms, sometimes large ones, and may tend to
shift avocats' attention from their colleagues to their clients. In addition, avocats
were able in 1990 to secure a monopoly over transactional work 3l only by accepting into their number members of another profession who were already
doing that work. These were the legal advisors or conseils juidiques who were
organized in firms. In fact, some conseilsjutidiques were lawyers from United
States firms who had established themselves in Paris as conseilsjuridiqueswhen
that profession was open to all. Part of the price the conseilsjuridiquesexacted for
agreeing to merge with the bar was acceptance of large firms with avocat employees.
Nevertheless, the rules and ideology of the bar continue to protect the independence of salaried avocats, at least on paper. Salaried avocats must have a written
contract, which the council of the local bar reviews to ensure that it respects the
principle of professional independence. The contract must allow the employee
to seek relief from an assignment contrary to her conscience, not hinder her
acceptance of legal aid work, and contain no clause compromising her independence. Employers and their employees must submit all disputes under those
contracts to the local bar's elected chief (bdtonnier)for his decision. In Paris, bar
regulations provide that a salaried avocat (not his employer) "remains master of
the argumentation he develops and the advice he gives," 32 although he is obliged
to notify his employer of any divergence from the employer's views. Salaried
avocats are also protected by their own national collective bargaining agreement
and by French labor law applicable to all employees. The ideal of independence
thus continues to help shape the French bar's response to the advent of large
31. See Law No 90-1259 (Dec 31, 1990), amending Law No 71-1130 (Dec 31, 1971). The monopoly
is only partial. Notaries, accountants and members of certain other professions have their own rights of
practice whose extent in some instances is the subject of current struggle.
32. L'Ordre des Avocats i la Cour de Paris, R~glement Int&ieur du Barreau de Paris, Art 10.3.6
(1991).
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firms and international competition. 33
IV.CONCLUSION

This paper has not even sketched a complete outline of the history of
French legal ethics. Nothing has been said about the bars and ethics of other
civil law nations, some of which have similarities to their French counterparts,
demonstrating that French legal ethics and rules are more than the product of a
peculiarly French history.34 Little has been said about the pressures that are now
reshaping the French bar and its ethics. (At times while writing the book on
which this discussion is based, I have feared that the subject of my research
would disappear before I could finish describing it.) Nor have I discussed the
French concept of a lawyer's virtues, which grows out of the bar's religious heritage and still appears, for example, in the Paris bar's rule that an avocatis obliged,
on pain of discipline, to manifest "dignity, conscience, independence, probity

and humanity, honor, uprightness,
delicacy, moderation, courtesy, disinterested35
tact.'
and
ness, confraternity
Of the factors I have tried to trace, the influence of other legal professions
on the ethics and ideology of avocats may be the most unfamiliar to United States
readers. Our own bar has faced competition from other professions-today
from accounting firms, and in the past from real estate agents and others. None
of these professions could be considered legal professions. In England, the relationships between barristers and solicitors are, of course, entwined with the history and ethics of each profession. Even England, however, cannot boast the
variety of professions that have entered this brief history of the ethics of avocatr
magistrates, notaries, avous, juistes dentrepise, and conseilsjuridiques. Other legal

professions might also have been mentioned, for instance the agries (who appeared in commercial courts) and the huisiers (process servers who also perform
certain legal services).
The influence of the work that lawyers do on their ethics is a more familiar
notion, but one that comparisons between different national systems may illuminate. We in the United States often take for granted that lawyers occupy government posts, negotiate contracts, plan corporate transactions, give business
advice, write wills, serve as trustees and corporate directors, interview witnesses,
33.

Decree No 91-1197, Arts 137-53 (Nov 27, 1991); L'Ordre des Avocats A laCour de Paris,
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and hope to end their careers on the bench. The accepted wisdom has been that
legal ethics until recently disregarded much of this activity, sticking dose to the
profession's roots in litigation. Surely this is not the whole truth. Professional
rules may have focused on litigation, but their authors spoke from a diverse and
powerful professional world. As members of other professions increasingly seek
to perform many functions that lawyers assume to be their own, consideration
of the relationship, if any, between the ethics of lawyers and their functions may
become important to practitioners as well as to legal historians.
Finally, it is worth considering that history itself, or at least one version of
history, has influenced the history of legal ethics in France. For avocats, their
values are bound up with the past struggles and glories of their profession. Their
understanding of their rules may depend more on Napoleon than on the adversarial system. The history they retell might be distorted or incomplete; it sometimes omits, for example, the Paris bar's gross deficiencies in independence and
confraternity when, during World War II, it implemented without protest the
Vichy regime's directive to expel its Jewish members. 36 Yet on the whole, understanding how lawyers have behaved and what the bar has done or suffered will
surely help us reach better conclusions about what lawyers and the bar should
do in the future.
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